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Plato’s account can be understood in two sections, his critical method, which
prioritizes true nature over false praise, and his account of Love. This paper is divided into
three sections. The first section discusses the importance of the critical spirit and explains his
praise of honesty and truth. The second section describes the nature of Love as virtues of
passion. In the third section, I criticize Plato for going against his virtues of passion because
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In the first section of this paper, I will discuss Plato’s endorsement of the critical
spirit. Socrates begins his account of Love by emphasizing the importance of truth and
justifies his account of Love as being true in contrast to the empty praise of his predecessors.
I analyze the accounts that Plato places into the mouth of Socrates’s predecessors to make
sense of Socrates’s claim of falsity in their accounts. I describe the role of truth in Socrates’s
account of Love as allowing for the appreciation of beauty. I also describe the relationship
between Socrates and Agathon as an exemplar relationship that values truth and honesty.
In the second section of the paper, I discuss the accounts of Socrates and Agathon in
relation to the passions. In particular, Plato describes Diotima’s ascension to the form of
Beauty as both rational and passion-driven. I describe the passion towards a wider field of
beautiful objects as the main virtuous passion in Socrates’s account.
In the third section of the paper, I describe the importance of love in Socrates’s
account. I describe Plato as endorsing Socrates’s view of beauty because Plato depicts
Socrates as having seen the form of Beauty. By depicting Socrates as having seen the form of
Beauty, he affirms the form’s existence and its effects. I criticize Plato for his hierarchy of
Love because it is not founded on evidence available and it is instead based on envy and
malice. These bad passions are contrary to the good passions he argues for in the second
section. Considering the importance of love in life and the importance of the good passions in
his account of Love, the criticism shows a serious contradiction in Plato’s thought.
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“Love of one is a barbarism;
for it is exercised at
the expense of all others.




1) Plato starts Socrates’s account with an emphasis on “what is true” (198d1-e1).
Socrates’s sarcastic praise of his fellow speakers, that they “attribute the greatest and
most beautiful characteristics possible to the thing in question, whether they are true
of it or not” (198e1-e5), raises the question of why Love has eluded them.
Unlike the dialogues that pick apart the arguments of interlocutors as they argued and
adding confidence and strength to the Socratic point of view over time, the speeches that
precede Plato’s portray the interlocutors as learned men, gathered together, clarifying their
ideas in discussion as learned men do. The building up of the speeches into a totalizing idea
gives it the appearance of respect and authority2. However, upon Socrates’s “praise”, the
speeches are unmasked of their erudite and grave tone. Upon the realization of the parodic
nature of the speeches that Plato puts into the mouths of Socrates’s interlocutors, we cannot
help but laugh at ourselves for taking them so seriously. Plato’s method is revealed in its most
vivid form as the ability to make light of serious speech, or to make the better speech worse.
2 Each speech can be seen as criticizing and building on its earlier speeches. In every speech there is
a reference to another speech, except the first one (Pausanias: Phaedrus(180c1-d1); Eryximachus:
Pausanias (185e5-a5), Aristophanes: Every speech preceding his own (his description of the
two-bodied humans mocks the exaggerated, socially accepted love, see passage 6) , Agathon: all
previous speakers (194e1-b1); Socrates: all previous speakers (198d1-e1), esp. Agathon (198c1-5),
Aristophanes (205d10-206a1) ).
1 Nietzsche, Friedrich. Beyond Good and Evil. Translated by Walter Kaufmann, Vintage Books, 1989.
p. 79
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Plato educates the reader in a spirit of critical philosophy that inspires courage and daring, for
only then is there freedom of criticism.
2) Naive Phaedrus. Phaedrus describes love as one of the oldest gods and as a useful
guide for living well (178a5-d1), because he inspires shame in the lover when he does
shameful things and motivates the lover to do great things (178d1-e1). Among his
sources is Hesiod’s Theogony, where Hesiod describes Eros as being the “most
beautiful among immortal gods, Eros that relaxes the limbs, and in the breasts of all
gods and all men, subdues their reason and prudent counsel” (Theogony, 120-125).
This seems to raise some suspicion as to whether or not Phaedrus is observing the
character of Eros in an unbiased or complete way, because description of Eros seems
to imply both irrationality and sublime primordial horror. Eros is described not only as
an ancient force of nature, whose nature precedes the cyclops and the monstrous
Hecatoncheires (140-155), but also other uncontrollable natural elements, such as the
Oceanus and the Sea3. By disregarding the sublimity, irrationality and terror of Eros,
his optimism obscures and taints his perception of the object.
Phaedrus argues there is nothing better than “a lover of a respectable sort, and for a
lover, a beloved of the same sort” (178c1-d1) for a man to live well. Lovers will be properly
guided by honor and shame because he will feel and react appropriately to the attention of the
beloved (178d5-e5). However, the literature that he cites do not seem to make those claims at
all. It is clear that if Alcestis were not to die for her husband, then her husband would not be
able to observe the shameful behavior. Achilles avenged Patroclus after his death despite
Patroclus being unable to watch his vengeance.
3 Eros is irrational in this account because it “subdues their reason and prudent counsel”. The horror
of eros is implied by its age, as the older the god is the less controllable it is (Chaos was the first. The
natural elements came later. The human elements came last.)
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By depicting Phaedrus with an unfounded and lopsided praise of Love, Plato portrays
Phaedrus as a naive theorist whose praise of love is poorly sourced and entirely neglects to
give a real description of Love itself, but describes an optimistic false Love instead.
3) Eryximachus the Learned Doctor. Eryximachus is portrayed as a standard figure from
Old Comedy, the Learned Doctor, who claims to have knowledge of many fields, but
as Trivigno (2017) points out, is ignorant, self-important and pedantic (p. 57).
Trivigno points out that while he is coherent and uses well-known medical theories (p.
52-4), he is portrayed with the stereotypical traits of the Learned Doctor. He is
depicted overextending his sphere of knowledge, by using medicine to describe the
world in a general and universal sense (p. 61). He is also portrayed as pretentious,
because he uses technical and superfluous language to bulk up his points (p. 62) and
his concepts fail to function precisely in practice (p. 64).
At first glance, Socrates and Eryximachus have very similar goals. They want a
theory that describes the nature of things universally, not only things being true in a particular
sense or expertise. But it is revealed throughout the dialogue that they have essential
differences. Eryximachus does not seem to care about what is true at all. Eryximachus
uncritically extends the principle of his field, medicine, to a universal theory. The theory’s
failure is seen even within the field of medicine as Eryximachus seems unable to put his
theories into practice. He advises against heavy inebriation but becomes heavily intoxicated
by the end of the dialogue. His solutions to Aristophanes’s hiccups is dubious, judging by the
evidence from the text, since he does not give a definitive solution and we cannot be certain
that the hiccups did not just go away on their own. Thus, if Eryximachus cannot follow his
own theories and they don’t appear to work for others, we can suppose that Eryximachus’s
theories don’t work. Thus, they evidently cannot guide behavior and cannot propagate the
good. Plato rejects conmen for their lack of utility in the sustainment of good life.
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4) The Critical Spirit of Aristophanes. From the eyes of Aristophanes, his dialogue is
meant to impose a moral message upon the guests through his use of comedy. He
communicates the tone of his enocium with the line: “my own fear about what I’m
about to say is not that I shall say things that are funny - that after all, would be an
advantage, and in the province of my Muse - but rather that I shall say things that
people will laugh out of court” (189b5-c1). Aristophanes describes the origin of
human beings as the result of cutting a pre-human being in half. He describes these
creatures as “entirely round, with back and sides making a circle, and it had four arms,
and equal number of legs, and two completely similar faces on a circular neck, a
single head for both faces, which looked out in opposite directions; four ears; two sets
of genitals” (189e5-190a5). Aristophanes describes the motion of these creatures
with: “when it launched itself into a quick run, just as tumblers bring their legs round
into the upright position and tumble in a circle” (190a5-b1). Aristophanes comically
describes a mass of these creatures cartwheeling to Olympus to seize power from the
Olympic gods. Their image of themselves as “terrifying in strength and power”
(190b5-c1) is shown to be hollow, as the gods did not even consider their coup to be a
serious threat, choosing to deliberate over their punishment upon learning of their
betrayal (190b5-c5)4.
The description of the original humans is one of the layers of Aristophanic parody of
Love. It shows the absurd and pretentious overconfidence of lovers when confronted with
love, typified in this dialogue by Phaedrus.
As punishment for the revolt, they are split in half by Zeus and fixed up by Apollo.
Apollo “twisted the faces round, and drawing the skin from all sides over what is now called
the belly” and “the wrinkles… on the belly itself around the navel, to be a memorial of that
4 The description of their strength followed by the ability of Zeus to wipe out their entire race with
lightning bolts is interpreted as humorous (190b5-d1).
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ancient suffering” (190c5-191b1). The gods immediately encountered a problem. The new
humans do not want to part, making it impossible for them to survive. Thus, Zeus reordered
their genitals to allow for sexual intercourse. With the pleasure of intercourse, they are able to
“pause from their search” and continue living (191a5-d1).
Aristophanes then states these reoriented lovers, when encountering their other half,
“are [nevertheless] overpowered in a quite amazing way by feelings of affection and
belonging and love, and they practically refuse to be separated from each other”, although
they “wouldn’t even be able to say what they want for themselves from one another. For no
one would suppose this to be sexual intercourse … that each of two shows such eagerness to
take pleasure in each other; it is something else that the soul of each manifestly wants, which
it cannot express, but dimly grasps what it wants, and talks of it in riddles”(192b5-d5). The
inability to clearly define the demand of what each wants from another raises a suspicion that
they wish to hide in polite and charitable views of their relationship, suggesting that the
lovers, being unable to state their true intentions of sexual desire, rely on social norms to hide
their shame. Aristophanes even uses Hephaestus as the god that mends the lovers together,
despite it being Zeus that split them and Apollo’s clear ability to heal them. He uses the
image of Hephaestus to draw links to the myth of Ares and Aphrodite’s entanglement. It
draws on the idea of embarrassment over their lack of control over Eros and humiliation of
being found out by the others (Obdrzalek, p. 78).
The true purpose of Aristophanes’s account is to embarrass those who claim to follow
the conventional idea of love and show that their true love is merely hidden by convention
and politeness. The original form of humans, the circular cartwheeling beast, is used to make
a mockery of the mythic idea of love, or to mock those that want to realize their
oft-exaggerated affection with their lover. Its strange and comical form is enough to make
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certain that lovers do not want to be “mended” by Hephaestus. Mending would instead be a
source of embarrassment and an absurdity.
5) Aristophanes’s Love. Throughout the dialogue, Aristophanes identifies a certain deity
as Love. He states that “people have failed to recognize the power of Love, since if
they were to recognize it, I think they would construct temples and altars to him on
the largest scale” (189c5-d1) and “we are to hymn the god who is responsible for that,
we would justly hymn Love” (193d1-d5). It seems that Aristophanes did not explicitly
name this god, or even give an account of his origin5, but we may not immediately
assume that there is no evidence as to who the god is. Aristophanes claims that “if we
for our part accord piety to the gods, he [Love] will establish us in our original
condition and, by healing us, make us blessed and happy” (193d1-e1). Thus, it seems
as though Love is actually the god Hesphaestus. This is another sure sign that this
account is parody, since Hesphaestus is notoriously bad with love, who is both
deserted by Aphrodite and failed to court Athena (Appolodorus, Library).
6) Plato’s Criticism: Aristophanes’s role in the dialogue. What is to be made of the
Aristophanic mockery of love? Perhaps his point of view arises from his character or
his passions. Aristophanes is speculated by Appolodorus to have stuffed himself in
the banquet, hiccupping as a result of the gluttony (Trivigno, p. 59). Plato, through
Socrates, describes Aristophanes as “his [Aristophanes’s] whole business is with
Dionysus and Aphrodite” (177e1-e5)6. Aphrodite is often depicted as able to drive
anyone, including her followers, such as Phaedra in Hippolytus, beyond reason and
6 I also concede that it is possible that Aphrodite and Dionysus can promote socially acceptable
sexual behavior. The point of this ambiguity is to not directly confront Aristophanes, but to joke about
his behavior. The other descriptions link Aristophanes to the chaotic, unsocial sides of Love, such as
his burping.
5 I doubt that the Eros described has to be the one in Greek religion. Although an interpretation can be
made for it, e.g. Eros is also irrational (thus one cannot reason as to why one feels it), I think that it is
possible that Aristophanes is nevertheless using Hephaestus to subtly mock his interlocutors. It is,
after all, Hephaestus that mends the lovers (in other words “establish us in our original condition, by
healing us”), not Eros.
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social norms by lust (Euripedes, Hippolytus). Dionysus is described by Isler-Kerenyi
(2007) as typically followed by satyrs and dancers (p. 9, 16). Plato also uses the
sexual allegory of the satyr to portray Aristophanes as a sexual fanatic, as satyrs are a
powerful and comical portrayal of obsessive sexual desire (Dover, p. 97).7 His
criticism of Aristophanes would be plain for his contemporaries: Aristophanes is
hubristic. His denial of the origin myth of love is likely an affirmation for the real,
natural condition of humans, without the divine myth, described as “[creatures who]
because their desire to grow back together, they died from not eating or indeed doing
anything else” and “Whenever, too, any of the halves died, leaving the other half
behind, the half that was left looked for another half and locked itself together with
that, whether it was a whole woman’s half it encountered… or a whole man’s”
(191a5-b10). The description of the creatures holding and not necessarily facing each
other is similar to depictions of sexual intercourse.8 His description of sexual desire as
overwhelming and uncontrollable, being greater than the desire for survival or food or
any other activity and is only temporarily satisfied each time with Zeus’s solution, “at
least be satisfaction from their intercourse, and they would pause from their search,
turning to their work and taking care of the other aspects of their lives'' (191b5-d1),
would have been readily identified as the vice of hubris by Plato’s contemporaries.
The creatures group up with any half indiscriminately and constantly, even if it wasn’t
their original half, which suggests no qualifications on the other was made9 (including
any social norms). The attitudes of the time would suggest that behavior done for the
desire of food or sex without regard to the firmness of character or strong will that
9 Gender is considered by Aristophanes (191d5-192c1), though this does not save him from being
hubristic, as the restriction does not distinguish good and socially acceptable from bad.
8 Their genitals are located opposite of where they are facing during the passage, so to join together
(back-to-back) the first humans would be facing their genitals together.
7 He describes Satyrs as “amoral creatures who obey their impulses. They masturbate constantly … if
no living being with a suitable orifice is available, but prefer horses, mules, or deer … ; even the neck
of a jar may be pressed into service”.
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came with good character was a terrible thing (Dover, p. 67).  This also presents the
greatest possible condemnation from Plato, as all other characters are at least able to
get to some concrete, albeit, specific or localized value of beauty, whereas
Aristophanes, accused of hubris by ‘his’ description of human nature, indiscriminately
finds lovers, regardless of physical beauty, and never reaches the first step on the path
of ascension at all.
Plato suggests that despite the great critical spirit of the comic Aristophanes, he is
unable to realize the importance of beauty and live a good life because of his lack of good
passion. He, unlike Agathon, is therefore disregarded and not spoken directly to.
7) Socrates and Agathon praise truth. Socrates says that if he was to continue along the
line of his predecessors, to “appear to be offering an enocium to Love, not that we
should actually offer him one” (198e5-199a1), he “wouldn’t have the capacity to do
it” (199a5-b1). Socrates cannot bring himself to only praise Love without any
understanding of Love. He states that “he [Love] will appear as beautiful and good as
possible - evidently, to the ignorant sort of people (not surely, to those with
knowledge); and the praise is attractive enough, even impressive” (199a1-5).
Socrates laments that he will be dismissed as a “laughing-stock” (199b1-5) and that
he would rather give up his turn than speak (199a5-b1). The reason for this can be seen in his
subsequent dialogue with Agathon, where Agathon dismisses his initial theory and is able to
accept Socrates’s theory because of his critical spirit, manifesting as concern for the truth, and
his passion for the good.
Agathon’s speech has interesting parallels with Socrates’s speech. They both begin
with the same kind of criticism of their predecessors, that they fail to give an account of the
essence or nature of love and merely provide an account of some tangential attribute. For
Agathon, the essence of Love is in its transformative power rather than mere (lesser) effects
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and he complains that previous speakers have not given an account of Love’s essence but
rather “what sort of character he gave them” (194e5-195a5). Along with Aristophanes, the
three of them make up the ones who outlast most other speakers towards the end of the
symposium (223c1-d1). What is common among them is their boldness in criticism, as they
are the only ones to criticize all of their predecessors. Socrates only attempts to enter into
Socratic dialogue with Agathon, and only him, throughout the entire work, such as when he
criticized him over his fear of shame coming from failure to impress the intelligent
(194a5-d1), his critical technique (198b1-199c1) and his account of Love being good and
beautiful (199c5-201d1), because of both his critical spirit and his good passions10.
8) Socrates and Agathon on the value of truth. The value of truth can be found in
Socrates/Diotima’s account of love.
In Diotima’s speech, she describes lovers that are pregnant in their souls who
encounter a “beautiful body and soul” as “immediately full of resources when it comes to
things to say about virtue” (209b5-c1). She says that the soul-lovers try to educate their lover
(209c1-5) and “by contact with what is beautiful [beautiful souls], and associating with it,
that he brings to birth and procreates the things with which he was for so long pregnant, both
when he is present with him and when he is away from him but remembering him; and he
joins with the other person in nurturing what [virtue]11 is born” (209c1-d1).
Therefore, Socrates’s motivation for singling out Agathon is that he has a beautiful
soul, unlike critical Aristophanes, that allows him to give birth in virtue by educating him
about his virtue. The soul is described as in its components “its traits, habits, opinions,
desires, pleasures, pains, fears - none of these things is ever the same in any individual, but
11 I have interpreted what is born to be virtue. This is because Plato says that one wants to reproduce
the good in themselves, not merely just themselves (205d10-206a10). Diotima also mentions that
reproduction is for the good in 206e5-207a5, “procreation is something everlasting and immortal, as
far as anything can be for what is moral; and it is immortality, together with the good, that must
necessarily be desired”
10 The good passions are discussed in essay II.
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some are coming into existence, others passing away” (207e1- 208a1). Diotima also describes
the relationship between knowledge and memory as being “forgetting is the departure of
knowledge, and going over something creates in us again a new memory in place of the one
that is leaving us, and so preserves our knowledge in such a way as to make it seem the
same” (208a1-b1). Therefore, Socrates argues that the lover, being in conversation with a
beautiful soul, a beloved soul that has the correct passions and desires and is interested in
genuinely, honestly discussing his (real, true) soul, not the mere appearance or fiction of his
soul, and in proving the beauty of his soul, the lover can confidently instilling his virtue into
his beloved’s soul through honest conversation12, or as Diotima puts it, he “tries to educate
him” (209c1-5). Therefore, the lover can sustain his good within the soul of another man. In
conversing with his lover, he reminds himself of their shared good and can carry their shared
good into the future. He can even sustain their good with the memory of his lover, a reflection
of the good inside of him. The lovers thus serve as the justification of the good of themselves
and each other.
9) The importance of criticism can also be shown in the way the talks progress. Far from
being the usual linear ascent, the dialogue only moves to its essential message, Love
as passion for virtue with an understanding of its relation to the human condition13,
when aporia (“It looks very much, Socrates, as if I didn’t know the slightest thing
about what I said then”, 201b10-c1) is reached and realized with Socrates’s criticism.
Criticism and the mutually shared respect and understanding for truth allows Socrates
to move Agathon, and not the other interlocutors, beyond his former position.
13 The human condition is discussed in Essay III, Sec. 4-7.
12 Diotima says that one can only reproduce (virtue in this case) in beauty. In this case, the beloved’s




The Virtues of Pathos
I will describe different virtues of passion in Socrates and Agathon’s accounts. I will
also highlight the importance of those virtues.
1) Eros as rational and passion-driven. Eros is regarded by many as intelligible and
rational, but also involving passion. Sheffield argues that “if this desire [eros] had no
relationship to intelligibility then it should not be a resource capable of being
deliberately and actively employed by philosophical practice” (p. 130) She also
argues that the myth of Eros “makes it plain that eros is not just a blind drive, or
passionate yearning: it is a cognitively informed state of desire, or motivation that
[has] some kind of deliberation about how to remedy that lack” and “an experience of
eros is complex and cognition-involving“ (p. 130-1). It will be useful to specify in
which way eros can be classified as rational, or a product of thinking, and which ways
eros can be seen as passion-driven.
The myth of Eros describes Eros as the child of Poverty and Resource. He is
described as “passionate for wisdom and resourceful in looking for it, philosophizing through
all his life” (203d1-e1). Love being described as passionate for knowledge and very capable
of finding it shows that he is passion-driven and rational. Furthermore, his father makes him
“a schemer after the beautiful and good, courageous, impetuous and intense, a clever hunter”
(203d1-e1). His scheming must involve some planning, which suggests rational thinking that
involves thinking through actions and their effects. The myth of Eros suggests Eros is both
related to the passions and to rationality.
2) Descriptions of the ascent of beauty. In other descriptions of eros, he is described as
both rational and passionate. The love of beauty is first described as a yearning not as
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a reasoned argument (207d1-d5). The ascent that Diotima describes from the initial
yearning, or to “fall in love with a single body and there procreate beautiful words”
(210a5-b1). It then progresses to “beauty of outward form”, then to “consider beauty
in souls more valuable than beauty in the body”, then to activities and the law, then to
“observe the beauty that belongs to kinds of knowledge”, then to the form of beauty,
which “always is,… neither comes into being nor perishes, neither increases nor
diminishes, not beautiful in relation to this but ugly in relation to that” and “in its own
company, uniform” (210e5-211e1). None of this describes a wholly rational
conception of beauty, because it also includes a virtuous passion for openness or a
passion for loving a wider and wider range of things, including rational knowledge.
Diotima describes the turn from loving one body to loving bodies as realizing that
“the beauty that there is in any body whatever is the twin of that in any other” (210a5-b5) and
being able to “relax this passionate love for one body, despising it and considering it a slight
thing” (210b5-c1). While ‘despising’ may suggest turning away from the one body
completely, Diotima still suggests that he consider it a slight thing and love for it is not
extinguished but relaxed. All this seems to suggest, not abandoning the minute beautiful
thing, but an ability to set aside the myopia that one may have when they are infatuated with
one body, as suggested when she says that “gazing now towards a beauty which is vast, and
no longer slavishly attached to beauty belonging to a single thing” (210c5-d5). However, to
recognize that two things are equal, or that something is “the twin of that” is to have
characterized beautiful objects under concepts that allow for that equality, which means the
ascent is also a rational process14.
3) Descriptions of beauty and the form of Beauty. She describes the science of beauty by
describing its reward: “life is worth living for a human being, in contemplation of
14 For example, to say that two balls are equal is to say, among other things, that their shape, a
concept of a sphere is shared between the two. This is the case for all things that are equal.
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beauty itself” (211c5-d5). The ability to contemplate beauty does not mean that
beauty itself is rational, just that it is able to accept (one/many) rational
categorizations.15
The esoteric nature of the form of beauty also suggests that it is to some degree
arational, for if it was rational it could be described with traits, conditions and boundaries,
which would make it easily teachable, instead of allowing Diotima to doubt if it can be taught
or not.
Furthermore, Diotima’s description of the ascent of beauty does not exclude removing
rational concepts that were placed on beauty. For example, a rational conception of beauty
that focuses on a certain object may cause a fixation on a certain object. This would prevent
one from reaching wider fields of beauty and thus would require removal.
Seeing that each stage of the revelation opens up new areas to find beauty and
dismantles the previous concepts of beauty that fix a certain boundary around the beautiful,
the ascent also involves dismantling some rational concepts that were put into Beauty. It is
also not the case that these rational concepts are dismantled purely through thinking and
realizing contradictions. This can be seen within the structure of the work and Plato’s
criticisms of characters other than Socrates.
The structure of this work is substantially different from works from the same period.
It has almost no dialogue (the exception being between Socrates and Agathon) but is instead
a collection of speeches. The structure of the dialogues can be compared with Symposium to
find important differences in which Symposium distinguishes itself from the rest of Plato’s
work.
In some of Plato’s dialogues, like Lysis, a rigid structure is proposed and exhausted
(ending in aporia). In Lysis, it is that love is between people which are similar, dissimilar or
15 I mean that irrational objects can have rational concepts put into them. For example, the concept of
confidence can be put into the general feeling that one has of that emotion, e.g. the concept that
includes feelings like a sense of strong will, etc., which in itself is not rational.
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neither, of which Socrates dismisses all the options. In some of his other dialogues, like
Euthyphro, a concept is given by the interlocutor, which is dismissed as inconsistent or
unacceptable (on the basis of the beliefs of said interlocutor). The interlocutors in Symposium
often suggest inadequacies through arguing that their predecessors lacked certain components
or prioritized the wrong thing , not on the basis of inconsistency (excluding Socrates’s
examination of Agathon). They criticize naivety or myopia instead of an outright error of
inconsistent ideas. In Pausinias’s speech, he corrects Phaedrus, not because he was
inconsistent, but did not take into account the differences in the two kinds of Love, Heavenly
and Common Love (180c1-181a1). As argued before, Aristophanes is dismissed by Socrates
for hubris instead of inconsistencies in his argument. Plato criticizes Aristophanes’s position
as being of poor taste, indiscriminately wanting both the good and the bad, instead of being
inconsistent.
4) Eros and Lacking, according to Diotima, applied to Agathon. Agathon’s similarity
with Diotima’s Eros provides a reason for taking his account seriously.
Diotima characterizes Love as “between the mortal and immortal” (202d10-e1), being
an entity that has “a lack of good and beautiful things” which “makes him desire the very
things he lacks” (202d1-d5). Love is thus not immortal because “all gods are happy and
beautiful” (202c5-10). He is also not mortal, because he does the “interpreting and conveying
things from men to gods and from gods to men” and “being between both, it fills in the space
between them, so that the whole is bound close together”. This is the only way that gods and
men can be joint since “God does not mix with man” (202e1-203b1). Diotima clarifies that
Love has both a desire for resources and wealth and the lack of these things. Love is also
characterized as being “neither resourceless at any moment is between wisdom and
ignorance” (203e1-204a1). Diotima describes people without Love as those who “doesn’t
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think he lacks something” and “certainly won’t desire what he doesn’t think he lacks”
(204a5-b1).
Agathon is questioned by Socrates on the reason for his shame in regards to
disappointing the intelligent. Agathon states that “You [Socrates] surely don’t think me so full
of theatre that I actually don’t know that to an intelligent person a few sensible people are
more frightening than a lot of stupid ones” (194b5-c1). Socrates acknowledges that he is
“perfectly well aware that if you met some individuals you thought to be clever, you’d care
more about them than you would about ordinary people” (194c1-c5). Despite playful banter
about each other’s intelligence, Agathon and Socrates both acknowledge each other’s respect
for wisdom. Agathon acknowledges Socrates’s wisdom when he says, “It looks very much,
Socrates, as if I didn’t know the slightest thing about what I said then” (201b10-c1), in
response to Socrates’s criticism of his account of Love. His acceptance of criticism also
shows his serious dedication and respect to the arguments of the intelligent, in this case,
Socrates. Agathon’s mistaken characterization of Love prevents him from obtaining a clear
understanding of Love. This is mirrored in Socrates’s conversation with Diotima. Socrates
also believed the same things as Agathon when he was questioned by Diotima, stating that “I
myself [Socrates] was saying to her other things of pretty much the very sort that Agathon
was saying to me just now, that Love was a great god, and was of beautiful things, and she
then set about examining me by means of the very arguments I was using with Agathon”.
Socrates also acknowledges Agathon’s misunderstanding to be “a pretty reasonable thing to
say” (201a5-a10). Socrates shows that Agathon’s acceptance of criticism mirrors the
improvement and advances in wisdom that he experiences in his youth, validating both
Agathon’s desire and capabilities for wisdom.
This shows a parallel between Agathon and the Eros myth. The awareness of his own
lack of knowledge and the desire of knowledge frames Agathon as a genuine character of
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Eros. This indicates that his account of Love should be taken seriously, in the sense that his
virtues of pathos may have validity, despite possible rational errors. By characterizing
Agathon as desiring wisdom and lacking it, Socrates positions Agathon as being capable and
worthy of education. He is unlike the equally critical Aristophanes, who share in their critical
spirit, but lacks the passion for wisdom and beauty that Agathon shares with Socrates.
Furthermore, emphasis is placed on the passions of Agathon because Plato depicts his
account with rational errors. Hence, it is elsewhere, particular in his desires and passions, that
he succeeds.
5) Agathon on Pathos and Love. Agathon’s account of Love is worthy of investigation
because Socrates’s insistence on interrogating Agathon directly and his admitted
similarities to Agathon. There are more similarities in their accounts than previously
mentioned, particularly virtues of pathos. They suggest a quality beyond rationality
(which cannot be the quality in question because Agathon’s theory is not coherent).
6) Virtues of Pathos from Socrates and Agathon. He describes Love as a unifying
defining force that allows a person to keep his good character, he says that “no
pleasure is stronger than Love; but if they are weaker, then they will be mastered by
Love” (196c5-d1), similar to Diotima’s account. He also argues that “certainly
everyone who is touched by Love turns into a poet”, “it is Love’s wisdom by which
all living things come into being and are born” and “whoever that has this god [Love]
as his teacher turns out noted and conspicuous, but whoever does not feel Love’s
touch stays in obscurity” (196e1-197b1), which indicates that he is aware of Love’s
ability to make someone creative, both in mind and in body, and able to propagate
themselves. This is similar to Diotima’s description of the creation of beautiful words
upon meeting something/someone beautiful. Socrates is seperate from Agathon in the
sense that Socrates is aware of the problem that arises from human nature and its
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necessary solution, in contrast to Agathon, which only seems to be vaguely aware of
the motivations and passions required for loving wisdom and good16.
Most significantly, he claims that “Love is … a poet skilled in all kinds of creation in
the sphere of music; for the sorts of things one either doesn’t have or don’t own, one can’t
give another person or teach anyone else” (196e1-197a5). This claim is interesting because it
is similar to Diotima’s description of the form of Beauty, she claims that “as for those aspects
relating to the final revelation … I don’t know whether you would be capable of initiation
into them” and she describes the realization of the form of Beauty not as a product of
understanding, but immediate, akin to sensation, as one has to “catch sight” (210e1-5) of the
form of Beauty rather than understanding it or knowing it. Although Diotima does not
outright reject the idea that it is possible to teach the form of Beauty, she is skeptical. Both
authors do claim that the object of Love, be it poetry or the form of Beauty, is known
immediately through love and is not taught through concepts.
7) The importance of Socrates’s respect both for criticism and the right kind of passion
are present in his account of Love and in his actions. Just as some of the previous
speeches can be seen as lacking critical spirit, they can also be seen as lacking the
passion towards beauty in all of its various manifestations. In the case of
Eryximachus, his theories not only lack rigour, but also fail to bring any good to his
life, or the life of any other (his cures don’t seem to work and he does not follow his
own advice), so it is hard to see what motivation it can bring to any life. Some do not
have the passion for Love because they simply do not have the good passions at all
(Aristophanes). In Socrates’s account, he places passions as an important requirement
for ascension and his account of passion can help understand the special role that
Agathon plays in the dialogue.
16 To see why propagation and reproduction is virtuous, see Essay III, sec. 4-7
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8) An account of the virtues of Pathos. The ascension of Beauty is by no means a purely
rational process in which one contradiction gives rise to another concept. But rather,
the rational concepts can be coherent and are not dismantled by reason itself, but by a
certain courageous and bold passion for good.
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III
The Cowardice of Egoism
1) Socrates and the Form of Beauty. It is important to know which account Plato actually
endorses to make sense of the dialogue as a whole. Socrates seems to be able to
contemplate the form of beauty in the text, which is important for interpreting whether
or not Plato endorses Diotima’s description. If Socrates is capable of contemplating
the form of beauty, it would show that Plato believed that it exists in reality and, given
his description of the form of Beauty as central to life, would also endorse attaining it
and attempting the ascent.
Prominently in the beginning of the dialogue, he was “wrapped up somehow in his
own thoughts, and got left behind [by Aristodemus]” (174d5-e1). Diotima describes the value
of the form of Beauty as “[it is the Form of Beauty], if anywhere, that life is worth living for
a human being, in contemplation of beauty itself” (211d1-5). This may explain Socrates’s
ability to lose track of his friend and abandon him despite agreeing to “work out what we’ll
say” (174d1-5). The importance of his friend is minute compared to the form of Beauty,
which is central to life’s worth. A similar incident is also mentioned in Alcibiades’s praise of
Socrates. Alcibiades says that “he was at daybreak with something on his mind, standing and
reflecting on it; and when he couldn’t make progress with it, he didn’t give up but stood there
looking for a way forward … until dawn came [tomorrow] and the sun rose; then with a
prayer to the sun, he went off” (220c1-e1). Alcibiades’s praise of Socrates is said by
Alcibiades himself to be the truth (214e5-10). Furthermore, the account is verified by
Socrates, for Alcibiades asked Socrates to “break in on me then and there if you like” if “ever
I [Alcibiades] say anything that isn’t true” (214e10-215a5)17.
17 It is possible that Socrates merely doesn’t take Alcibiades’s account seriously and does not refute it.
However, he does refute his accusations before (214d5-10), which suggest this is not the case.
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2) Signs of ascent. Alcibiades describes the earnest inner soul of Socrates to have statues
inside that are “so divine, golden, so outstandingly beautiful and amazing, that I had
to do … whatever Socrates told me to do” (216e5-217a5). Alcibiades also describes
Socrates’s thoughts as “the only ones, of the things one hears, that have intelligence
within them … the highest degree divine, contain within them the greatest number of
statues of virtue, and have the greatest reach … to everything that is appropriate for a
man who means to be a person of quality to consider” (221e5-222b1). This would
suggest that Socrates is capable of beautiful thoughts. These beautiful thoughts are
transformed into words, which are then spoken to Alcibiades, who finds them
beautiful. He praises Socrates for those words by describing his power as “used to
charm people … by the power that came from his mouth” (215c1-5). Notably,
beautiful thoughts and beautiful words are lower portions of the hierarchy of Beauty.
Socrates is also described being able to ignore great physical and emotional strain,
which allows him to take part in beautiful activities. Beautiful activities are a stage in the
ascent to the form of beauty (210c1-5). Alcibiades describes his physical feats, such as eating
and drinking as little or as much as he would like (219e5-220a5). He is also described as
being able to weather the cold, wearing only a himation instead of the many layers that others
wear and crossing ice barefoot for a better grip (220b1-c1). He is said to be calm in battle,
“observing people on our own side and on the enemy’s in the same calm way” (221b1-5).
Socrates also resisted the advances of beautiful Alcibiades (219c1-d5), for which he is
praised as being a “truly superhuman and amazing man” (219c1-5). Furthermore, his ability
to drink is also mentioned in the beginning of the dialogue by Eryximachus (176c1-d1).
The initial stages in the ascent of beauty are mentioned as things that Socrates is
involved in. He is involved in the beauty of activities, the appreciation of beautiful souls and
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their dialogues,18 and beautiful knowledge and words. His involvement in the initial stages
shows the readers that he is qualified for the form of Beauty.
3) There are two prominent ways in which Plato can be seen as depicting Socrates
without experience of the form of beauty: Diotima’s doubt and Alcibiades’s
description of Socrates struggling with an idea, which is implied to be the form of
Beauty. This is because Diotima argued that the contemplation of the form of Beauty
is the only possible thing worthwhile in life and because it seems to be the only thing
mentioned that can cause one to think at such an extraordinary length. I will evaluate
the evidence for these cases as possible counterexamples.
Diotima tells Socrates, “I don’t know whether you would be capable of initiation into
them [aspects relating to the final revelation]” (209e5-210a5). Beautiful thoughts precede the
final revelation (210c5-e1), the form of Beauty. Thus, it seems entirely possible that Socrates
is merely struggling to get past beautiful thoughts, which consume him for prolonged periods
of time. Hence, he could be seeming to but not actually contemplating the form of Beauty.
This can also be seen in Alcibiades’s description of Socrates’s thinking, “something on his
mind, standing and reflecting on it; and when he couldn’t make progress with it, he didn’t
give up but stood there looking for a way forward” (220c1-e1), which suggests some
difficulty in his contemplation. This does not describe the form of beauty, which is beautiful
unconditionally and immediately experienced (“catch sight”).
Socrates’s experience of the form of beauty seems possible but is not directly
confirmed in text. This could have been an intentional choice. If Plato wanted to confirm his
abilities, he could have just had Diotima confirm it, or have Socrates admit that he has
experienced the form of beauty.
18 See Essay II for Socrates’s appreciation of Agathon’s mind.
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However, I think it is possible to accept the ambiguity as a consequence of the
esoteric and incommunicable nature of the form of Beauty.
Furthermore, I think that Diotima’s doubt is likely due to her understanding that the
form of Beauty is difficult to attain. Thus, she has doubts that Socrates may attain it,
especially given the errors in his description of Love he gives in the beginning of their
conversation. I think Alcibiades’s description of Socrates as struggling is a misunderstanding
on Alcibiades’s part, as to contemplate the form of Beauty is described to be a life-affirming
and enjoyable activity and therefore the duration of thought is not because of its difficulty but
because of its importance for life and the delight it brings the contemplator.
The esoteric nature of the form of Beauty prevents Socrates from proving he is able to
see it by preventing him from communicating or describing it, leaving his experience of the
form ambiguous. The esoteric nature of the form of Beauty is cryptically described to both
Agathon and Alcibiades.
Socrates tells Agathon that it is not possible for the knowledge of the form of Beauty
to flow from one person to another like “water in cups which flow from the fuller into the
emptier through the thread of wool” (175d5-e1). Socrates is referring to knowledge of the
form of Beauty because Agathon was asking about the “bit of wisdom of yours, the bit that
came to you in the porch” (175d1-5), where he had previously been described as forgetting
Aristodemus to stand and think there for a prolonged period of time (175b1-5).
Socrates urges Alcibiades to “take a better look” as he doubts Alcibiades actually sees
his beauty. He comments that “The sight of the mind … first sees sharply when the sight of
the eyes starts to fade from its prime … you are still far away from that” (219a1-b1), which
suggest that Alcibiades may be mistaken about Socrates’s Beauty, even if he can see past
physical beauty and partially enjoy the beauty of words and ideas. Thus, Alcibiades can be
mistaken about Socrates struggling with his thoughts or any higher objects of beauty.
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Furthermore, Alcibiades is aware of Socrates’s beautiful words and thoughts
(215c5-d5), which only leaves the last stage, the form of Beauty, left for Alcibiades to be
ignorant of. When comparing the form of beauty to his other objects of Beauty, the other
objects would be comparatively nothing19. Thus, Socrates’s suggestion that it is possible for
Alcibiades to mistake Socrates for being “nothing” can only make sense if Socrates himself
thinks that he has seen the form of Beauty.
Though it still is ambiguous that Socrates has the form of Beauty or not. The evidence
points towards Socrates having interacted with the form of Beauty by the time of the
Symposium.
4) Composite and ephemeral selves. Diotima describes the human desire for immortality
when she stated that “All human beings… are pregnant in body and soul, and when
we come to be of the right age, we naturally desire to give birth” (206c1-c5).
She explains the desire by describing human nature as “mortal nature” that “seeks so
far as it can to exist for ever and to be immortal”, it “can achieve it only in this way, through
the process of coming-into-being, because it always leaves behind something else that is new
in place of the old” (207d1-d5). She even applies this to living individuals, as she says “even
during the time in which each living creature is said to be alive and to be the same individual
… and yet, if he’s called the same, that’s despite the fact that he’s never made up from the
same thing, but is always renewed … in the case of the soul, too, its traits, habits, opinions,
desires, pleasures, pains, fears - none of these things is ever the same in any individual, but
some are coming into existence, others passing away” (207d1-208a1). Diotimia reveals that
the human self is merely a composite of mental and physical things, of which all can pass
away if not reproduced. Diotima also states that living creatures desire to reproduce only
good things (205d5-206a5). Thus, Diotima is not merely arguing that there is a certain fear of
19 Diotima describes the higher objects of love making the lower objects seem like nothing, see
Symposium lines 210b5-c1.
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death and that one would try to live forever, but rather, human beings will desire the
permanence of their virtues.
5) Coming-into-being and ephemerality. If the self is in a constant state of
coming-into-being, humans need to reproduce themselves in every instance to sustain
themselves. The self is a composite of the material body and the soul, which is itself a
composite of “traits, habits, opinions, desires, pleasures, pains, fears” (207d1-208a1).
Thus, knowing that all of those elements that make up the self are in a constant
coming into being, the self too must be in a constant coming into being that needs to
be reproduced to be sustained.
6) Mortal goods compared to immortal goods. The mortal good is but a brilliant flash. It
is cherished for a moment and never again, nor before. Subjectless from then on, for
the shifting subject is not guaranteed to remain receptive to its goodness, the mere
mortal good may not even qualify as a good memory20. Apparent to all good men, the
immortal good with duration, or a little immortality, is immeasurably better than its
mortal equivalent. For whatever fleeting good without duration cannot inspire
confidence and love of life in the future and thus cannot inspire the will to live for any
being. Afterall, why should one commit to anything, knowing that it could be
valueless to him in an instant. Life itself becomes impossible with mere mortal goods.
Diotima describes love as “of procreation and giving birth in the beautiful”
(206e5-207a1), making it clear that lovers do not love the beautiful, but rather love
what they create in the beautiful, in other words, they love their goods carried into the
future by beauty.
7) Plato’s hierarchy of beauty seems to be quite strange to those who look upon it too
keenly. The valuation of the mind over the body is built upon a strange foundation. It
20 The self is subject to change and thus can become different enough to not perceive their previous
goods as goods.
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is based upon Diotima’s comment that ideas are of “a more beautiful and more
immortal kind” (209c5-d1), because ideas, “provide them [the lover] with immortal
glory and remembrance because they are themselves immortal” (209d1-e1). Diotima
cites poets, Hesiod and Homer, and lawmaker, Solon, whose ideas have been
immortalized and worshiped like gods by cults, unlike the body, who is not worshiped
(209d1-e5).
Ideas must be seen as altogether different from my common, lower, embodied view.
For it seems to me that ideas are just as capable as bodies in their ability to fade from
memory, as Diotima says (207e5-208a5). Most ideas, thought, read or heard, are forgotten
nearly immediately after they are experienced. The same can be said of most bodies, which
barely catch the eyes of observers and deserve little attention. When comparing the prime of
the body and the prime of the mind, are they not comparable? Cults of the body exist
alongside cults of the mind. Royalty and aristocracy are cults of the body, where the right to
rule is inherited upon their birth. It may last as long as any ideological or religious cult. Is it
also not possible that one can gain their virtuous pathos by being born virtuous instead of
cultivating it?
Not giving proper weight to these facts seem to make Socrates’s motivations suspect.
So why does Socrates insist upon a higher valuation of the mind than the body? Is this not a
product of resentment over the philosopher’s infamously ugly appearance21? This is not an
indictment of the personal nature of the passion, for the other products of beauty are personal
too.
Socrates’s account has a connection with the personal on almost every level, as shown
when Diotima relates that the love for fame is a kind of love that sustains the self. She states
21 Nails, Debra. “Socrates.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Stanford Center for the Study of
Language and Information, 2018, plato.stanford.edu/entries/socrates/. Citing in particular:
“The extant sources agree that Socrates was profoundly ugly, resembling a satyr more than a
man—and resembling not at all the statues that turned up later in ancient times and now grace
Internet sites and the covers of books.”
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that “you’d be surprised at their irrationality … if you don’t think about it, and reflect on how
terribly they are affected by love of acquiring a name for themselves” (208c1-d1). She cites
the motivations and actions of poets and lawmakers as examples of that behavior. She argues
that when one finds someone with a “beautiful body and soul” and educates him, and “by
contact with what is beautiful… he brings to birth and procreates the things with which he
was for so long pregnant” (209c1-5). Diotima also describes love as being “for the sake of
immortal virtue and this sort of glorious reputation that everyone does everything, the more
so the better people they are, because they are in love with immortality” (208d5-e5) and in
the case of those that are interested in the body, “a memory of themselves, and happiness, as
they think, for themselves for all time” (208e1-209a1). This seems to suggest a deeply
personal connection with the beautiful things in every stage described by Diotima.
The question lies instead in whether it gives rise to a passion that inspires a genuine
attempt to spread his virtue.
8) Socrates on physical beauty. Socrates seems to reject physical beauty for no good
reason, despite his endorsement of passion for wider ranges of beauty22 .Possible
reasons for rejection are because he is tired, he does not think that Alcibiades is
beautiful or he thinks that Alcibiades can be educated in a higher beauty. None of the
possible reasons apply when he rejects the physical beauty of Alcibiades.
Socrates is following the view of Diotima, who is “the very person who taught me too
[along with postponing the plague] about erotics” (201d5-e1). She endorses physical beauty,
albeit as having lower value than beauty of the mind (210b5-c1).
Socrates shows little signs of wariness in discussion or anything else. He had an entire
night of discussion during the night of the Symposium and did not sleep afterwards. Hence,
sleeping is not necessarily what would have been good for him.
22 See Essay II, section 2
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A good reason for Socrates to not engage with Alcibiades’s physical beauty may be
because it prevents Alcibiades from realizing his potential for higher beauties. We may
charitably assume that it is better for Alcibiades and Socrates if Socrates could elevate
Alcibiades to a higher stage of beauty and that would explain Socrates’s abstanence. None of
the telltale signs of that possible alternate elevation are present. They did not engage in
conversation and instead “lay there all night long” (219c1-5). Furthermore, Alcibiades
himself claims that he is not capable of accepting instruction, as “whenever I [Alcibiades]
leave him [Socrates], I’m giving in to my desire for the honour that comes from ordinary
people” (216-b1-c1). While they do engage in dialogue (217d1-e1), Socrates doesn’t show
much of an interest in the conversation. He “wasn’t quick to accept this [dinner] invitation
from me” and “wanted to leave immediately after dinner [the first time]” (217d1-d5). Thus,
elevation is not a reason for not engaging in his beauty.
Socrates may have also accepted his invitation and spoke to Alcibiades only out of
politeness and had no interest for Alcibiades’s physical beauty. Therefore, he does not
resentfully deny himself the beauty of Alcibiades because Alcibiades is not actually beautiful.
But that does not seem to be the case, Socrates does think Alcibiades is beautiful. He does not
interrupt Alcibiades when Alcibiades says that Socrates claimed Alcibiades has “fine looks”
(218e1-5) and remarked that Alcibiades has “apparently beautiful [goods]” (219a1-5).
So neither is it the case that there is a greater beauty to be had nor that there was no
beauty at all in the activity that they would engage in. So why does Socrates reject the
proposal, despite Alcibiades’s beauty and Alcibiades’s willingness?  The only explanation
seems to be that Socrates is envious of Alcibiades’s beauty and refuses the enjoyment of
beauty, his prerogative, out of spite. He is unable to leave his personal vices behind as
Diotima suggested (205d10-206a5). Thus, Plato seems to have an inconsistency in his
treatment of physical beauty. His treatment of physical beauty is altogether inconsistent to his
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general valuation of beauty, as depicted in Diotima’s account. In the account, the ascent to the
form of Beauty involves reaching to evermore abstract and far-reaching ranges of beauty
without rejecting completely, the lower objects of love.
9) Malice. When describing the esoteric nature of the form of Beauty, he sarcastically
said that he believed his own wisdom was inferior and illusory, whereas physically
beautiful Agathon’s wisdom was obvious to his audience (175e1-10). In doing so,
Socrates is implying that wisdom as interpreted by the crowds was not obviously wise
and in fact illusory, compared to his own wisdom. He is unlikely to think that his own
wisdom is actually inferior, illusory or non-existent. Nor will Agathon’s comment
about his remark, rebuking a sarcastic comment make sense, since Socrates would not
be making an absurd point if he actually believed his knowledge was illusory.
Agathon is depicted to have taken offense to this statement, and accuses Socrates’s
accusations of being “downright criminal” and says that “[they will] take our rival
claims to wisdom to court” (175e5-10). Furthermore, he seems unjustified in
criticizing Agathon so fiercely (198b1-e1), given the similarities in critical methods
and their account of Love.
Similarly, Socrates tells Alcibiades that in trying to swap beauties, he is attempting
“to get hold of truly beautiful things in return for only apparently beautiful ones” (219a1-a5).
Notably, Plato seems to gleefully describes Alcibiades’s misery arising from his
beauty being disregarded. He places into Alcibiades’s mouth: “this man so much got the
better of me, looked down on me, laughed at my beauty, treated it criminally - and it was just
in that respect that I thought I was something” (219c1-d1). The characterization of Alcibiades
as having no ability to gain the beauty of ideas, due to his weakness in resisting pressure from
the crowds, and yet not able to appreciate the beauty that he does have, suggest endorsement
of Socrates’s unnecessary disregard of Alcibiades’s beauty. While Socrates lack of interest in
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physical beauty may suggest poor passions in regards to (physical, in this case) beauty, the
combination with the description of Alcibiades’s pain seems to suggest malice by the writer,
Plato. Furthermore, Plato’s malice is targeted especially toward the beautiful men of the
group, suggesting they are targeted because of their physical beauty.
10) Plato’s shortcomings. It will seem that despite Plato’s emphasis on good passions,
illustrated most notably through the role of the passions in the ascent and Socrates’s
choice of Agathon as a dialogue partner, there remains elements of bad passions
within the dialogue itself, insofar that they prevent the appreciation of beauty in many
fields. Given the value of beauty stated by Diotima, as important for maintaining the
good in life, this shortcoming is an important flaw in Plato’s account of Love.
Furthermore, Plato also seems to hide the reason for his malicious passions, envy over
physical beauty, contradicting the valuation of honesty as described in essay I.
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